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DECLARATION OF SUSAN V.
ANDREWS IN SUPPORT OF PET TION
TO REVOKE THE LICENSE OF ETRA
TECH EC, INC.

1 I, SUSAN V. ANDREWS, declare:

2 Background and Work History
3

1.

I started working in the nuclear industry in September 2003. My first job was at

4 Bottom Atomic Power Station near Delta, Pennsylvania. The employer provided a two- eek class

5 for new recruits like me. They trained me as a junior deconner, which is the lowest rung on the
6 totem pole of radiation workers. "Decon" (decontamination) means cleaning something f
7 radiation that a senior Health Physics Specialist ("HP") has found using meters. As a de onner, I
8 worked at: the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant in Florida; the D.C. Cook Nuclear Po
I
I

9 in Stevensville, Michigan; the Limerick Generating Station in Pottstown,

Pennsylvani~;

10 Dominion Millstone Nuclear Power Station in Waterford, Connecticut; and the North A
11

Nuclear Generating Station in Louisa County, Virginia. Most of these jobs lasted about

irty days

12 each.

13 2.

I then worked at Oak Ridge, Tennessee for the Department of Energy's Oak Rid e

14 National Laboratory. Oak Ridge is the largest nuclear and science research nationalla6 ratory in
15 the Department of Energy's system. That job lasted approximately nine months. This wa my first
16 job as a Junior HP, tor which they gave me six weeks of extensive training related to the scanning,
17 handling and safety procedures for radioactive materials. After Oak Ridge, I went to the .E.

18 Ginna Nuclear Power Plant in Ontario, New York, where I received more training on ho

to use

19 various instruments, including how to source check the instruments, and how to make su c that
20 these specialized instruments are cmTectly calibrated. The training included classes, testi g, and

21 the use of mock-ups. The New York job lasted about a month. I then retumed to the Don inion
22 Millstone Nuclear Power Station in Connecticut as a Junior HP. Millstone lasted 21 days and then
23

I was laid off. In all of the nuclear related jobs I held, the supervisors over my work per nnance

24 informed me they were pleased, valued the work I did for them, and I was considered a is illed and
25 valuable employee.

26 3.

After I left Millstone, I received a phone call from Kari Guidry, the Human Reso rces

27 Manager ofNew World Environmental ("NWE"), a radiological-staffing company. She pparently

28
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1 had heard I was looking for work through a mutual acquaintance. She offered me a Seni r HP
2 position at Hunters Point Naval Shipyard ("HPNS"). I told her I wasn't qualified for aS ior HP
3 position; I didn't feel at that point I had acquired enough experience to be a Senior HP, lthough I
4 had received extensive training and experience as a Junior HP. Guidry said that a senior osition

5 was the only one that was available and urged me to take it. I did not accept because I b lieved
6 that based on my training and experience, and what I had seen of the training and experi nee

7 necessary to be a Senior HP, that although I had extensive experience in the nuclear ind stry, it
8 did not meet the industry standard yet for a Senior HP position. Instead, I waited until a unior HP
!

9 position opened up at HPNS and I took that position at Hunters Point when it became av ilable
10 and was offered to me.

11 4.

I was at HPNS for approximately six and a half years. I was employed by New,

12 except for the last year, when I was employed by Aleut World Solutions ("AWS"), anot er
13 radiological-staffing firm. I worked for NWE at HPNS from June 27, 2005 until on or ~ out

14 December 31st of 2010. I worked for AWS from early 2011 until December 16, 2011. At all times
15 during my employment at HPNS by NWE, I was supervised by both NWE and Tetra Te h. During

16 the year I worked for AWS, I was supervised by both AWS and Tetra Tech. My immedi te
I

17 superiors at both companies reported to Tetra Tech personnel, including its top two on-si e
18 managers, Dennis McWade, the Construction Superintendent and Bill Dougherty, the H.
19 Project Manager.

20 5.
21

When I started work at HPNS in 2005, I worked as a Junior HP for approximate)I

month doing surveys. My supervisor was Senior HP Justin Hubbard.

22 6.

One time during the month I was doing surveys in2005, I saw people talking OllJ
I

23

phones when taking soil surveys in the Radiological Survey Yard ("RSY"). An RSY is a 'lay
I

24 down area" where soil is spread out to be scanned for radiation. At later times the scam1i
!

'

25 done using a towed-array detection system, and at other times the scanning was done wi

a hand-

26 held sensor instrument. An HP talking on the phone while doing surveys for radiological

27 contamination in an RSY was strictly prohibited; no phones, food, or water were allowed I

28
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1 complained 8:bout this to HP Supervisor Justin Hubbard. He, in tum, complained that I
2 performing surveys too carefully and slowly, and moved me to the Portal Monitor.
3 7.

The Portal Monitor is an instrument that is designed to assist in detecting high le els of

4 gamma radiation. Two 7 foot towers containing radiation detecting sensors were used

d placed

5 so that a truck could drive between them. If excessively high radiation was emitted fr~

the load

6 carried by the truck, and if the high radiation was not screened by soil, moisture, and tp. truck
7 bed, then the Portal Monitor alarm would be triggered and set off an alarm to alert staff hat
8 excessively high radiation emissions were detected. The Portal Monitor was used at H, ters Point
9 to scan trucks that entered or left the shipyard to prevent high levels of residual radiatiq
10 release levels coming in or leaving Hunters Point.

11 8.

I worked at the Portal Monitor for approximately a month at that early time in 2

5. When

12 I was assigned to the Portal Monitor, I made certain I was thoroughly familiar with the
13 procedures and totally understood them before operating it. I stuck strictly to the proced re and
14 turned trucks around if they failed to clear the Portal Monitor. However, after about amI nth,
15 Justin Hubbard told me I was failing too many trucks resulting in increased costs and de ays for
16 Tetra Tech, as if I was to blame. It was as if he thought I had the ability to cause or prey nt the
17 Portal Monitor alarm bring triggered, which was not the case. The Portal Monitor trig,e ·ng an
18 alarm was based on the sensitivity setting of the sensors, how slow the truck drove throu h the
19 sensors, and whether materials screened the sensors from detecting the residual radioacti e
20 contamination. When a truck failed the Portal Monitor, proper procedure required the H to scan
21

the truck and try to identify the sources of the excessively high radiation materials in th~ truck bed.

22 I diligently worked on scanning and locating the excessively high residual radiation
i

23

contamination, and made sure the soil load was sent back to be re-worked. Prior to Sept mber

24 2011, every failed soil load was required to be sent back to the RSY screening yard to Q
25 worked. Justin Hubbard and other supervisors working under Tetra Tech made it know to me
26 through comments and attitude, that Tetra Tech wanted the trucks to pass, pass quickly~
27 doing my job carefully at the .Portal Monitor was not something that was valued, but a n gative.

28
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1 As a result, I was removed from the Portal Monitor and was told that if I wanted to rem in at
2 Hunters Point I could work in the on-site laboratory as a lab assistant, which I did.

3 9.

I worked in the lab for approximately four years. In 2009, I was moved out ofth lab

4 because they needed to downsize the lab by one employee. They moved me out to the fi ld as a
!

5

Senior HP. I still did not believe I was qualified to be a Senior HP since Tetra Tech at H

ters

6 Point did not provide the type of training to employees that was required to progress to t e level of
7

a Senior HP that I had observed in the industry. I shared my belief that I had not gotten he

8 training necessary at Hunters Point to be a Senior HP with Tetra Tech's Project Manage , Bill
I

9 Dougherty, but he did not respond. I took the job despite feeling unqualified because I

ri eded the

10 work and it paid well. I worked as a Senior HP for NWE for approximately a year and a half,
11

followed by about a year as a Senior HP for AWS.

12

10.

I was laid offby New World in December 2010 for the standard year-end holidft

13 down. Because NWE had lost its contract with Tetra Tech and was to be replaced by A
14 Tech asked the HPs who worked for NWE to submit an application to A WS, which I di
15 were all told by Tetra Tech when we left for Christmas break that we would have ajob:t report
16 back to after we returned from our break in January.
17 11.

As of January 2011 under A WS, Bert Bowers of Tetra Tech EC was my direct s pervisor

18 for two weeks until he was removed from the Hunters Point project by Project Manager ill
19 Dougherty. After Bert Bowers was removed from the site, Bryan White, also of Tetra T ch EC
20 became my new on-site supervisor. I reported to Bryan White until December 16, 2011,
21

hen I

was laid off. Bryan White reported to Adam Berry, who in tum reported to Erik Abkem ier, the

22 Radiation Safety Officer ("RSO"). Bill Dougherty was the Project Manager who

overs~

23 Navy-funded project at Hunters Point. Berry, Abkemeier and Dougherty all worked fo11 etra Tech
24 and supervised us.

25 12.

On December 9, 2011, Brian White notified me I would be laid off as of Decem er 16,

26 2011. On December 16, 2011, I was laid off.

27

28
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1 Culture of Incompetence and Fraud

2 13.

Having been extensively trained in proper radiological procedures at nuclear po

3 I understood the dangers of the work and the need to follow strict procedures. I took pri e in

4 doing my job in a professional manner, "by the book." f:Iowever, at HPNS I often witnr sed what
5 I'd call "bad rad practices."

6 14.

Tetra Tech had a culture at odds with what I'd been taught. Rather than the HPs

7 independent of Tetra Tech's Construction Department, the needs of the Construction D

artment

'

8 overrode proper radiological procedures. Tetra Tech created a culture of cutting corners ·n order to
9 speed up rad work to get "free release" of areas, material or buildings. Written procedur s were
10 ignored and in some cases didn't exist, as further described below. This unhealthy cultu e was

11

exacerbated by unqualified rad supervisors who deferred to Tetra Tech construction rna agement

12 -management unqualified to direct radiological work- rather than requiring that proper
13 radiological procedure be strictly followed.

14 15.

At Hunters Point under Tetra Tech EC, there was also a culture of covering up i

15 rad practices. HP supervisors had an "early warning system" in which the construction
16 management staff in the office provided an alert to them when the chief radiological safi ty officer
17 on site, the Radiation Safety Officer's Representative (RSOR), Bert Bowers, was about

come

18 out to the field. Thus alerted, the supervisors knew not to openly engage in improper pra tices, at
19 least until the RSOR went back to his office. I witnessed the warnings and that workers i the field
20 changed what they were doing due to the alerts, and I learned from my co-workers that
21

is early

warning system was used throughout Hunters Point to hide improper rad practices.

22 Unqualified Workers

23 16.

One of the bad rad practices I observed and was concerned about during my ten,
I

24 Hunters Point was the hiring of unqualified workers.

25 17.

My first example of this, as described above, was when Karl Guidry insisted I co ld be

26 hired as a Senior HP when I knew I didn't have enough experience for that position.

27

28
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1 18.

Another example of an unqualified HP was Jane Taylor, whom I firmly believe

lsified

2 her resume to ge~ a job as a Junior HP.

3 19.

Jane Taylor's daughter, Samantha Taylor, had worked at HPNS as a Junior HP b fore Jane

4 Taylor was hired. Samantha Taylor told Richard Stoney, a Senior HP who related the st ry to me,
5 that her mother had no radiological work experience.

6 20.

Samantha Taylor asked me if she could email her mom's resume to me so I coul print out

7 a copy to submit it to NWE, which I agreed to. The resume was printed out and submitt d on May

8 25, 2006. It listed "Taylor Made Construction" as the only radiological work experienc~ Jane
9 Taylor had, and stated she had worked doing extensive radiological remediation work fo years for

10 the company. Both Richard Stoney, a senior HP and Bert Bowers, the RSOR, knew ne

y all of

11 the employers in the nuclear industry that would perform the type of work listed, and th y told me
12 they had never heard of Taylor Made Construction; they thought the reference to TaylQr Made
13 Construction as a source ofrad experience was a fabrication. The resume also stated th~ Taylor

14 had passed the Department of Energy (DOE) CORE test (a test created by DOE for testi g the
15 knowledge an HP is expected to have mastered). The CORE test is one of the most imp

ant

16 qualifications in our industry.

17 21.

Bowers told me he brought his suspicion of resume fraud to the attention ofKari Guidry,

18 NWE's Human Resources Director.
19 22.

I was asked to print out a second resume for Jane Taylor which was printed out a d

20 submitted on June 28, 2006 after Taylor has been hired to work at Hunters Point. This se ond

21 resume deleted all references to Taylor Made Construction and the CORE test. I believe he
22 second resume deleted these qualifications because Jane Taylor was afraid ofbeing foun out for
23 the fraud she engaged in with the false resume.
24 23.

Despite her lack of experience and apparently fabricated resume, Taylor was hire to work

25 at Hunters Point as a Junior HP. Within several months she was promoted to Senior HP.
26 24.

Based on my observations, it was apparent that Jane Taylor was incompetent. On example

27 concerned the way Taylor's soil sample team operated. Senior HPs led sampling crews a d

28
6

1 collected soil samples from grids mapped out by engineers. Jane Taylor led a sampling rew
2

composed of an HP to scan the soil and one or two laborers who collected soil samples. observed

3 that Taylor didn't know how to read the maps-she couldn't tell east from west, north o south,
4 nor the more specific details involved in the maps. Taylor's incompetence resulted in mi directing

5 the laborers as to the correct location from which to collect soil samples. Taylor's incortl etence
6

affected not just the work of the laborers but the work of all members of the crew. None of their
!

7

tasks were being coordinated properly. The samples were taken from an incorrect grid,

d were

8 recorded and labeled erroneously.

9 25.

Taylor was eventually assigned to the RSYs where she supervised the towed art

scanner.

10 I observed that she scanned the soil on the RSY pad at a much faster speed than is requj
!

11

proper results. If she didn't want to find radiation, scanning at a faster speed than is prq

12 be a perfect way to prevent finding radiation contamination.

13 26.

Another indication of Taylor's bad rad practices was allowing her daughter, Vkt ria, on

14 site without having had the proper training and without being issued protective equipme t like a
15 dosimeter. Victoria should not have been allowed in the field. Every time I saw her ther I brought
16 it to the attention of Bryan White. I complained to him about it approximately a half-doz n times
17 but no action was taken to my knowledge.

18 27.

Richard Stoney worked his way up over 20 years in the nuclear plant industry fr m an

19 entry-level position to being a Senior HP. When NEW, at TTEC's behest, promoted 'Ji lor to a
20 Senior HP with only a few months of experience and none of the required industry traip ng,
21

Stoney objected to his supervisors. Stoney observed Taylor's work and he told me it wa

22 him that she did not have the qualifications for the job, so Mr. Stoney told me he quit an told
!

23

management that this was the reason he quit. He told me he would not work at HPNS if hey were

24 going to let people with no experience and no training work there and put them in imp9 ant
I

25 positions as they had with Taylor. Mr. Stoney informed me that it offended his sense of
26 professionalism and could be dangerous to have individuals like Jane Taylor working on such a
27 rad project.

28
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1 28.

Another unqualified HP was Tina Robertson. This became clear to me as a resul

2

incidents in which Robertson took faulty readings from building surveys. The HPs had

3

"buddy system" for going into an empty, unworked and locked building. Proper procedu e

required

4 required two HPs to enter. When you go into a building of that type, you have to sign on the
I

5 Radiation Written Permit ("RWP"). You also need to fill out a logbook declaring the ins ruments
6 you are taking in, the scope of your work, and why you're entering. One time when we1 ere doing
7

a building scan, Robertson got agitated about the "hot" readings she was getting. I obse

8 she was not getting the same readings I'd gotten and was interpreting the readings inco

ctly. I

9 talked with her about the instrwnent and the readings. As a result, I realized that Robef on did

10 not understand her instruments, and how they worked. I told my supervisor, Bryan Whit , that
11 Robertson was not qualified or capable of doing her job. I also told Adam Berry when a imilar

12 incident happened with Robertson in another building. I tried from then on to avoid havi g to
13 work with Ms. Robertson as part of the buddy system.

14 29.

Based on my personal observations of their work and their statements and behavi r, I

15 concluded that besides Taylor and Robertson, HP Supervisors Justin Hubbard and Steve olfe

16 were unqualified for their positions; they were qualified to be Junior HPs, not Senior HP , and not
I

17 HP supervisors. In addition, JeffRolfe, a Senior HP and Steve Rolfe's brother, was not

alified

18 to be a Senior HP, but rather was qualified to be a Junior HP, based.
19 Radioactive Fence
20 30.

The point of taking readings by meters and sampling was to prevent contaminate objects

21 from leaving the HPNS site. Due to directions and pressure from Tetra Tech supervisors
22 readings of soil and objects that were seeking to leave Hunters Point were sometimes i • red or
23

'

even worse, destroyed. One time in 2009, I took readings of fencing around the perimete

24 Radiological Controlled Area/Radioactive Materials Area ("RCA/RMA"). The reading~ om the
25

instrument I was getting was what I'd call "screaming hot." Dennis McWade, Tetra Tee

26 Construction Superintendent, was present when two other Senior HPs and I were conduc ing the
27 readings. McWade contested the reading, saying it wasn't possible the fence was contam nated.

28
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1 He also said the fence had to be cleared so Tetra Tech wouldn't have to pay for it. Due o the
2

pressure from Mr. McWade who made it very clear he did not want the fencing to be fo nd

3 contaminated with radioactive material, I wanted to be absolutely sure that my meter re ings
4

showing elevated radioactive activity were correct. I therefore took additional reading~ sing my

5 instrument as well as the instruments belonging to Phil Poole and Bob Evans, the other
6 were there working on the fence scanning. I used three different meters, and every one o them
7

showed the same screaming hot radioactive results. According to proper procedure, the ence

8 should have been stored inside an RCA/RMA because it was radiologically contaminate , and

9 disposed of as radioactive waste. Dennis McWade did not allow us to take the action of toring the
10 fencing in an RCA area.
11

31.

I had taken not only instrument readings of the fencing that showed elevated rad· active

12 emissions, but I also took physical samples of the contaminated area with what is called "smear."
13

In taking a "smear" I use an approved material and wipe the surface of the item to be tes ed, here

14 the fencing. I identified the smear and submitted the smears and the instrument informa ion to the
15 office at the end of the day.

16 32.

The next day the lab had run the smears and the smears came back with very ele ated

17 radioactive results well above the Navy's release standards. Based on the smears and the
18

instrument readings the process confirmed the fencing contained an unacceptable level [f

19 radioactive contamination and had to be disposed of as low level radioactive waste.

20 33.
21

I was called into the office of the Tetra Tech Radiation Safety Officer Represent tive at the

time, Mr. Charles "Chuck" Taylor, with my supervisor Rhonda Richardson. Mr. Taylor old me

22 that Tetra Tech would not allow the fence to be treated as contaminated with radioactivi y, and
23

that I was to get the smears and the lab results fi·om the smears and destroy them. Mr. T ylor also

24 ordered me to delete the data from my instrument and the company computer of the fen e's
25

elevated reading for he wanted no record of the elevated radioactive readings for the fen in g. Mr.

26 Taylor told me that I would be tenninated if I did not follow the orders to destroy these
27 radiological records and data. My supervisor, Rhonda Richardson told me prior to the

28
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1 with Mr. Taylor that she feared for her job and for mine, and that I was to be quiet durin the
2 meeting, and if anything needed to be said for us to retain our jobs she would do it. At o time did
3

Ms. Richardson object to Mr. Taylor and his orders, or contend that the destruction ofle itimate

4

lab results and instrument readings that showed high radioactivity was improper. I did

5 Taylor ordered by obtaining the smears and lab results and destroyed them. I also went
6 company computer and did what I could to delete the record of the elevated fence scan ;r adings.

7 34.

The Tetra Tech company computer used a program called "Access". I and other in the lab

8 were trained on the "Access" program. From my training on the "Access" program, I w s led to
9

understand that although I might try to delete information from the computer, the info

10 would be retained in a host of files that I could not access and delete. I suspect that SOl"fl where in
I

11

the Tetra Tech computer the instrument scans and lab smear results have not been totall erased as

12 a result of my actions. I informed Rhonda Richardson that I had followed the orders of
13

r. Taylor

and destroyed the records and data.

14 35.

During the next month or so, the fence was improperly left outside of an RCN

A.

15 About a month after Chuck Taylor directed that the data be destroyed, Senior HP Bob E ans told
16 me he had gotten the fence released. When I asked him how that happened, he said "I di n't scan
17 where you did, dummy." The fences were labeled Rental Fences by United, and were re
18 United Rentals in their radioactive contaminated state.

19 Frisking
20 36.

Proper procedure for people leaving an RCA-RMA required that they be "frisk~d "That is,

21

their hands and feet are checked to confirm that they are not taking any radiation out oft at area. I

22

observed that frisking was not taking place. I reported this matter to Bryan White about: 0 times

23

during the year I was employed by A WS (20 10-2011 ). There were times when I wasn't he HP

I

24 manning a gate and I saw somebody leaving an RCA without being frisked. When that h ppened,
25

I left my work zone to try to get that person frisked. Tetra Tech HP Supervisor Justin H bbard

26 told me to mind my own business, that it was not my responsibility to assure that individ als were
27 frisked as required, and not to intercede again. I reported the matter to Bryan White. He aid that

28
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1 he would handle it, but nothing changed or happened, and people continued to leave RC

areas

2 without being frisked for their own protection and the protection of others.
3 LabWork
4 37.

Working at a remediation site with radioactive materials is dangerous and requir s

5 adherence to proper procedures and the use of proper personal protective equipment ("P E"). In

6 October 2011, I observed two laborers working in the lab, who obviously had not been a equately
7 trained. Their names were Luis and Alfredo (I do not recall their last names). They were
8 "pounding" dirt for radioactive sample testing using a mortar and pestle with their bare 1 ands to
9 prepare samples for analysis and were not wearing gloves or face masks. They were app rently

10 unaware not only of the radiation exposure they were risking, but also the danger of eros
11

contaminating the samples. This indicated that they were not properly trained to handle

12 When I asked them what they were doing, they replied that Robin Fluty, one of the lab

13 liked them and that they were allowed to help out all the time.
14 38.

I was very concerned about untrained laborers working with radioactive materi~l without

15 protective gear and warned them about the dangers of radiation. Shortly after this incidet t
16 involving Luis and Alfredo, I went to the office and got out the procedure book to see w at the
17 qualifications were for laborers who processed soil samples. Bill Dougherty, Tetra Tech s Project
18 Manager, came into the room and asked me what I was doing. When I told him I was lo king up
19 the procedure to see iflaborers were allowed to process soil samples, he told me I didn't need to

20 be looking that up. He said there was no current written procedure allowing laborers to t ke
21

samples, but that a procedure would be written to cover the matter. I never saw the labo ers

22 working the lab in a manner that would reflect proper procedures were being followed. I was very

23 concerned that they were risking their health and the integrity of other samples.
24 Sample Storage

25 39.

The storage of radioactive materials was not always handled properly, resulting i the

26 health and safety of workers being endangered. A certain building was used for storing r dioactive

27 material. It may have been building 271 but I'm not sure. The area next to the elevator s aft in the

28
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1 building was separated into two sections. One of them was fenced off. Jars of every sam le that
2 had been tested by the lab since the beginning of work at HPNS were stacked in this fen ed-off
3

section. I kept an inventory of the jars during the years I worked in the lab. At one point, I went to

4

the building and found that the jars in the lower stacks had gotten crushed by the jars on he higher

5 stacks and were leaking potentially radioactive dirt onto the floor of the area. I told Phil oole,

6 who had accompanied me, not to step on the dirt. The laborers in the group were steppin on the
7 radioactive dirt, even as I told them "don't step in it," which was indicative of their lack ftraining
8 and experience in rad work. Walking in radioactive soil could result in radioactive mate · al being
9

spread throughout areas that were clean of radioactivity, such as the break area, bathroo

10 offices, etc.

11

Portal Monitor

12 40.
13

Trucks loaded with soil and debris that were cleared by radiation surveys to leav Hunters

Point had to first successfully pass through the radiation-detection Portal Monitor to con mn that

14 nothing above radioactive remediation levels left the shipyard. If the truck and its load filed the
15

tlrst pass through the Portal Monitor, the truck had to go through the Potial Monitor aga n. If the

16 truck failed two out of three passes, the procedure was that the truck was not pennitted t leave
17 Hunters Point. [As further discussed below, this process was changed in September of2
18 allow trucks that failed the Portal Monitor to leave Hunters Point.] Prior to September 2
19 failed truck was directed to an area where two HPs were required to thoroughly scan the vehicle

20 on its undercarriage, sides, and from the top of the truck by use of a scaffold that allowe the HPs
21

to climb up and scan down into the load of soil in an attempt to locate the source of radi tion. I

22 was assigned to the Portal Monitor, when needed, after I left the lab in 2009, and am ve
23

familiar

with the Portal Monitor procedures from that time. The HPs would document their scan findings.

24 In my experience the most effective scanning of a truck load that failed the Portal Monit r was the
25

scanning done from the scaffold, which allowed us to scan down over the top of the soil in the

26 truck bed. Every truck that failed the Portal Monitor using the full scanning, including t e
27 scaffolding, that I was involved with resulted in the high radioactive material being loca ed.

28
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1

41.

After the HPs scanned the truck, the truck was required to be returned to a RSY ard where

2 its load was dumped and the survey process was redone entirely. At the RSY yard the so I was
3

spread out to a uniform depth of about six inches. A towed array detector system ("towe array")

4

was slowly pulled over the pad by a small tractor. After I was moved out of the lab in 20 9, I was

5 often assigned the Portal Monitor function until the end of my employment
6

42.

There were written procedures at HPNS for every job that I was involved with th thad to

7 be performed. Jane Taylor was put in charge of the RSY soil pads in late 2010 or early 2 11. After
8 that, a lot of the trucks were failing the Portal Monitor screening. Prior to Taylor taking ver

9 supervision of the RSY pads, experienced and more qualified Senior HPs than Taylor w e
10 assigned to the RSY process. The HP was to oversee the taking of soil samples from the highest
11 radioactive readings on the soil pad, and in that process, try to remove that radioactive m terial.

12 The soil samples were sent to the Tetra Tech EC controlled lab on HPNS. If any sample came
13 back with radioactive readings above release levels, further scans and sampling was requ red of

14 the pad until all lab tests came back at levels below radiological free release levels. The oil was
15 not to be put onto a truck and sent through the Portal Monitor until the pad was clean of azardous
16 radioactive materials that was detectable.

17 43.

Under the direction of many HPs prior to Taylor being put in control over the RS

yards,

18 at the insistence of Dennis McWade, the level of truck failures through the Portal Monito was
19 modest. After Jane Taylor began oversight and control of the RSY processes, the frequet cy of
20 Portal Monitor failures immediately increased dramatically.

21 44.

I was concerned for both the soil going off site, and the soil that was used as back til at

22 Hunters Point. The soil going off site was tripping alarms with greater and greater freque cy. The
23

potential of hazardous radioactivity in the soil going off HPNS was steadily increasing w th Jane

24 Taylor's supervision of the RSY process. For example, I recall that one day in the first h lfof
25 2011, nearly every one of the approximate 37 trucks that came with soil to go through th Portal
26 Monitor failed. However, at least the soil going off site had to go through the Portal Mo itor as
27 some form of check on the work to remove the radioactive materials from the soil. The ti e and

28
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1 expense to Tetra Tech ,to re-process the RSY soil was significant, as it involved repeat s .pling
2 and lab analysis. The supervisors made it clear they wanted the trucks to be cleared, not
3 45.

For the soil designated to be used as back-t111, which was a majority of the soil th t came

4 from the HPNS trenches, the backfilled soil did not go through the Portal Monitor after t e RSY
5 processes directed by Taylor. The soil used as backfill could have been loaded with hi
6 radioactivity that the sampling directed by Taylor avoided or missed. I suspect the soil
7 back-fill was done more poorly and contrary to procedures even more than the soil goin
8 since it was known that there was no check to be sure it was done right. After the contra ts Tetra

9 Tech had with the Navy went to fixed price contracts, TTEC made more money the less hey had
10 to do with the soil. Taylor's ignoring or avoiding excessive radioactive contamination fo soil to
11 be used as backfill made more profit for Tetra Tech EC. Based on what my supervisors t ld me, it
12 also made the Navy happy that the process was moving along.

13 46.

One day in September 2011, Tetra Tech simply changed the setting of the Portal . onitor

14 to lower the sensitivity. For years prior to that the pre-set sensitivity level for the Portal
15 was 3 sigma plus mean background level, which corresponds to the remediation goals un er the
16 Navy contract. In September 2011, Tetra Tech relaxed the Portal Monitor sensitivity frot 3 sigma
17 plus mean background to 8 sigma plus mean background before the truck load would fail the
18 Portal Monitor screening. A sigma 3 means that the Portal Monitor was set to a sensitivit in
19 which it was to alarm if the sensors picked up radiological contamination at a level ofba kground
20 plus 3 times that background amount of radiation.
21

47.

I questioned why Tetra Tech had dramatically lowered the sensitivity on the Port I

22 Monitor which would allow loads of soil with radioactive contamination much higher th n
23

established release levels to leave HPNS. I asked Bryan White and Adam Berry, two Te a Tech

24 EC supervisors, who were there on site, why this change that lowered the Portal Monitor
25

sensitivity was being made. Berry told me that the reason for the change was that they w re going

26 to have a lot of off-site shipments and some ofthe trucks would have aluminum beds wh'ch, he
27 said, could allow radioactive contamination to be more easily detected by the Portal Mon tor. It

28
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1 was explained to me that with so many off-site shipments expected, if the failure rate w

high, it

2 would slow down the clearance of soils that Taylor and her crew were processing at the SY
3 yards. I did not think his explanation made sense. I asked to see the new procedure that uthorized
4 this change. Tetra Tech management did not have one. I refused to follow their oral dire tions that
5 altered the Portal Monitor procedures. Tetra Tech subsequently wrote a Portal Monitor rocedure
6 with two fundamental changes, including the altered sensitivity setting and, as further di cussed
7 below, changing the way a failed truck load was scanned. Even after the weakening oft e Portal
8 Monitor standards, most of the trucks were still steel framed truck beds, and the weaken d
9 standards were applied to those truck as well as the aluminum bed trucks that were supp sedly the

10 impetus for the change in sensitivity.
11

48.

A second change besides the weakening of the sensitivity of the Portal Monitor om stgma

12 3 to sigma 8, was the process that took place after a truck failed the Portal Monitor. Eve after the
13 Portal Monitor standards were dramatically weakened, trucks corning from the RSY pad
14 processing regularly failed the Portal Monitor by setting off the alarm two out of three p sses or
15 more through the monitor. Tetra Tech EC gave directives that fundamentally made the
16 Monitor useless to prevent radioactive materials above release levels from leaving HPN . In the
17 years before the change of September 2011, when a truck failed the Portal Monitor the
18 material was not allowed to leave HPNS without having been returned to the RSY pads

r further

19 remediation to remove radioactive wastes. Consistently HPs such as myself, found the h gh
20 radioactive materials when we scanned the truck after the failure through the Portal Mon tor, but

21 almost only when other HPs or I scanned from standing on top of the scaffolding and sus ended
22 the scanning instruments over the top of the trailer down toward the soil. In the years le
23

ing up

to September 2011, very seldom did scanning through the metal bed of the trailers result n the

24 scan readings identifying the high level radioactive waste in the truck trailer. Rather, we
25 hot results by scanning from over the top of the trailer.
26 49.

In September of2011, Tetra Tech EC changed the post-failure Portal Monitor pr cedure in

27 two ways that resulted in soil that might have exceeded the release standard being allowe to leave

28
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1 HPNS as if the soil was clean ofhazardous radioactive contamination. First, Tetra Tee EC
2 barred HPs from using the scaffolding and scanning over the top of the truck trailer side down to

3 the soil in the truck beds. Tetra Tech management knew that this was the only way to r liably
4 obtain hand held scan readings of the high level radioactive contamination due to the ye s of

5 experience at the Portal Monitor. I believe that Tetra Tech management barred HPs sue as
6 myself from using scaffolding after the years of using it at HPNS because Tetra Tech m nagement
7 had the intent of having soils with radioactive contamination above release levels to be leared and
8 allowed to be shipped offHPNS to the unsuspecting public that got the soil, to get the c mpany
9 profits and get the work done quickly to please the Navy.

10 50.

The second post-failure Portal Monitor change that Tetra Tech EC instituted inS tember

11 of 2011 was that a truck load of soil that failed the Portal Monitor was now permitted to eave
12 HPNS without further remediation if the HP scans through the metal beds did not find t e high
13 radioactive material readings. Before September of20 11, every truck load of soil that fi 'led the
14 Portal Monitor was required to be re-remediated on the RSY pads to clean up and remo
15 radioactive contamination. In September of2011, nearly every single truck load of soil
16 the Portal Monitor was released to the public because the restricted non-scaffold hand sc ns that
17 scanned through the metal trailer beds almost never were able to locate the high radioact ve
18 material, as they had in the past when using the scaffolding to scan over the top of the si es of the
19 trailer.

20 51.

Another practice I objected to was Tetra Tech's routinely hosing down trucks tha were

21 about to enter the Portal Monitor. The reason I objected was that water acts as a shield to some
22 radioactivity. There was no reason to hose down the trucks just before they were to go th ough the

23 Portal Monitor. If there was a dust issue the trucks could have been hosed down after th y went
24 through the Portal Monitor and before they left HPNS. It was impossible to accurately s an a
25 hosed-down truck in the Portal Monitor for the radioactivity would be masked and not d tected. I
26 also objected to using the Portal Monitor when it was raining, for the same reason.

27
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1 Disregard for Posted Areas
2 52.

i

In July 2011, there was an incident where Jane Taylor instructed a driver to remol e the

3 ropes demarcating an RCA-RMA, and to ignore the established procedure for frisking to ensure
4 that radiation was not taken out of that posted area. This happened in an area where radi active
5 containers were stored above ground in an RCA-RMA. Tetra Tech hired a company call d EMS to

6 transport radioactive materials. The procedure was for the EMS driver to have an HP es rt him
7 into that area to take those containers to another area to prepare them for off-site shipmer. The
8 container and driver had to be frisked to ensure that no radioactive materials were taken rutside of

9 the posted area, other than what was included in the protective containers. Taylor told th driver to
1

10 take the RCA rad rope down, go into the RCA posted area and get his containers, and th

t no HP

11 had to be there to supervise the job. The EMS driver, Curtis, reported this irregularity to hil
12

Poole and Bryan White. The two of them and I went over to the RCA-RMA in question, and made

13 sure that the procedure was followed properly. White later "wrote up" a complaint again t Dennis
14 McWade who had stated that he directed or approved of Jane Taylor's procedural violati n, rather
15 than write up Jane Taylor. I believe that McWade was covering for Jane Taylor since De nis
16 McWade was married to Jane Taylor.

17 53.

I

In August 2011, I was covering Work Area 33. The workers were removing a pi~ce of pipe

18 from the ground. I found that one of the construction workers, Hank, moved the RAD pdsting
19 back from the established the boundaries of an RCA, areas know to have high levels of r dioactive

20 contamination present. By moving the postings of the RCA back, potentially hazardous
21

radioactive areas now appeared to be non-impacted radiological areas where radiologica safety

22 measures were not enforced. I stopped Hank and told him that he couldn't move radiati n
23 postings at his discretion. The delineators of a RCA area are not supposed to be moved;
24 indicate a radioactive area that needs to be controlled for the health and safety of those

orking, as

25 well as to keep radioactive contamination limited to the areas it already exists, rather tha
26 spreading it around due to sloppy work practices. Moving those delineators was a blatan disregard

27

28
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1 of proper procedure. The HP in control of that area, Justin Hubbard, wasn't competent o vigilant
2 enough to prevent this obvious breach· of proper procedure and safety.

3 Other Bad Rad Practices
4 54.

HP Tina Robetison told me that the Chain of Custody ("COC") forms for soil sa ples that

5 were sent to the labs were being forged. On July 22, 2011, she told me that "someone," sfle didn't
6 say who, was falsely signing COC forms for someone else. The forms were coming out dfthe
7 office already signed with a person's name on it, when the samples hadn't been collected yet. I
8 reported the matter to Bryan White. White told me he then told Dennis McWade, the Cot struction

9 Superintendent. Nothing happened as a result of this complaint.
10 55.
11

There was at least one incident when two untrained field workers delivered a radi active

source to a secure lockup area. The radioactive source was captured at RSY-4. Jane Tayl rand

12 Marie Winder, another HP, brought the source to be secured in a lockup area. There are
13 procedures for entering the building and for placing such radioactive material in the lock p. I

14 prepared the torms that had to be filled in. I heard on the radio that a frisker that checks t em for
15 contamination on their body, was ready to frisk Taylor and Winder on their leaving RSY 4. I went
16 out to the parking lot as Taylor and Winder were pulling up to the lockup, without havin been
17 frisked. Taylor tried to give me the source material, contained in what we called a "PIG," a steel
18 container for radioactive materials. I explained the procedure to Taylor, one that any Seni r HP
19 should have been familiar with, and told her that she had to take the source into the locku with

20 Winder and record it due to chain of custody requirements and safety procedures. Taylor hen tried
21 to have Winder go in the building alone with the PIG and log it in, contrary to procedures Taylor
22 then told me to open up the PIG and take a look, in violation of all procedures for safe ha dling of
23 radioactive materials. You are not supposed to do anything of the kind right in the middle of the
24 parking lot, and moreover without personal protective equipment. Bryan White, who had een
25 waiting for their arrival in the secure building, told Taylor and Winder that because they
'

26 demonstrated by their behavior that they didn't know how to handle delivery of source miterial,
27 they would be trained right then and there. However, minutes later, as White and I waited 'n the
1
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I

1 parking lot to train Taylor and Winder, we saw Jane Taylor and Dennis McWade, Jane lfaylor's

2 husband and Tetra Tech's Construction Superintendent, drive off-site for lunch. Taylor r fused
3 training on this basic HP function. No action was taken to ensure Taylor received the tr ining that
4

was a necessary part of her job, nor was anything done due to Taylor's refusal of the trait ing that

5 White said was required.

6 Informing the NRC
7 56.

The bad rad practices I witnessed at HPNS caused me a great deal of concern. I' heard

8 that RSOR Bert Bowers had filed a complaint with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission "NRC")
9 and I felt compelled to report my concerns to them in November 2011. I reported, for ex mple,
10 what I'd been told regarding the Chain of Custody forms being forged and made out befi rehand,
11

and urged the investigator I spoke to at the NRC to investigate the COCs. In particular, i

12 November of20ll, I suggested that the investigator compare the signatures on the COCs with
13 those of the purported samplers. However, the investigator, Orysia Masnyk Bailey, NRC Health
14 Physics Specialist, apparently did not go to the trouble to do so.

15 57.

I also took photographs of the radioactive materials storage area including the bro en Jars

16 with spilled content, and reported this danger to the NRC, including providing Ms. Baile with the
17 photos. Ms. Bailey failed to go to that pruticular area in the building, at1d failed to perfo

a

18 proper investigation.

19 58.

Because the NRC didn't adequately follow up on my concerns, I concluded that t

20 wasn't interested in doing a serious investigation of Tetra Tech's rad practices at HPNS.

felt the

21 NRC "blew me off' rather than take my concerns seriously. For example, I suggested the NRC
22 investigators interview people whom the NRC never contacted. The NRC also failed to fi llow up
23

on suggestions for where to take samples and what buildings at HPNS to inspect.

24 59.

I raised concerns more than once to my supervisors that the radiological remediati n was

25 not being performed properly, that unqualified individuals such as Jane Taylor were perfo

mg

26 important function~ in an incorrect manner, and as a result the radioactive contrunination t
27 Hunters Point was not being fully cleaned up as the Navy agreement required. More than once my
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1 supervisors told me words to the effect that I had a long term, good paying job, and that neit er I
2 nor the others working at Hunters Point were going to live near Hunters Point afterwards so ust
3 take the money and shut up about things not being done right. I was deeply disturbed by th
4 attitude of the supervisors and some of the other workers that not doing the job of radiologi
5 remediation correctly was fme since they knew they were not going to live in the area.

6 60.

Over the years of working at Hunters Point, it became clear to me that the Constructi )11

7 Department of Tetra Tech did not respect HPs' professional responsibilities, or the hazards f
8 radiological contamination. Rather, HPs were treated as an impediment to production and th
9 needs of the Construction Department to cut costs, increase profits, and increase speed in m eting
10 contract terms with the Navy which overrode proper radiological procedures.

11 61.

Since I left HPNS, I have learned that some COCs for soil samples taken there indic te that

12 the soil samples were taken exactly five minutes apart over a period of hours. Based on my
13 training and experience, this isn't possible. When taking soil samples in the field, HPs need to
14 follow exacting practices to decontaminate all sampling equipment between samples.
15 Having to take the time to locate the next sampling location and decontaminate the
16 equipment between samples - including allowing them to air dry - makes it virtually
17 impossible to collect soil samples every 5 minutes.

18
19

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of y

20 personal knowledge.
21.
22 Executed on ft.J -/S
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25 Susan V. Andrews
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